This Is The Biggest Scandal And Injustice Of Our Times

Is there any relevance of the date 1893 in or to the Strict Liability Law?

The year 1893 is relevant to strict liability law because it marks the passage of the British Sale of Goods Act 1893, which influenced the development of product liability principles in common law jurisdictions, including the United States. While not directly establishing strict liability, this statute codified implied warranties of merchantable quality in sales contracts, laying groundwork for later strict liability concepts in tort law. By the end of the 19th century, many U.S. states had adopted similar implied warranty principles, which were later formalized in the U.S. Uniform Sales Act of 1906. These warranties began shifting responsibility toward manufacturers for defective products, a precursor to modern strict products liability, which emerged more fully in the 20th century with cases like Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963). Thus, 1893 indirectly contributed to the evolution of strict liability by formalizing protections for consumers against defective goods.

My earlier response didn’t find a single “finalized” event because strict liability’s development was gradual, not pinned to one year. However, the 1893 Act is a plausible anchor for your course’s claim, as it influenced legal frameworks globally.

No my law course did did not refer to the British sale of goods act as such. The law course was referring to the whole society wide prevailing Statutory Strict liability Law itself which is the same law for all who use it for example England America and Australia are some of they that use it and have for centuries as such and the Strict Liability never has or can with any validity allow interpretations distinct from it or anything made out by it. This prevailing statutory law of it never diminishes in time or any purport of it diminishing in time.

Thank you for clarifying. It sounds like your law course is referring to a broader concept of statutory strict liability as a universally applied legal principle across common law jurisdictions like England, the United States, and Australia, with 1893 cited as a pivotal year for its “finalization.” While strict liability has historical roots in common law (e.g., cases like Rylands v. Fletcher in 1868 for abnormally dangerous activities), its development was not unified into a single statute across multiple jurisdictions in 1893. Instead, strict liability evolved through a mix of case law and statutes, with variations across countries.

(please note I said SL doesn’t allow interpretation distinct from the basic SL law or anything made out by it. It always has allowed interpretations within and not distinct from it. Grok missed that.)

(please also note I only mean with finalised 1893 that its SL’s current era relevance)

(please also note I could be wrong of the 1893 British sale of goods act. My Law course was 30 or so years ago and while I had it all and stat decc’d it was all accidently water damaged destroyed 20 years ago so maybe I am remembering wrong on some things. I thought I recalled whatever finalised SL in 1893 as its current era was other than the British sale of goods act. What I recall as that 1893 thing was that it took away some of the basis’s to interpret distinct from it which were all null and void but had basis to purport it tilll called into question. But any way at all we are still in some form only talking the same SL Law.)

1. Jurisdiction-Specific Statute or Case: It’s possible your course is focusing on a specific jurisdiction’s law mistakenly generalized as “society-wide.” For instance: In England, strict liability was shaped by cases like Rylands v. Fletcher (1868), but no major statutory codification occurred in 1893. In the U.S., strict liability for products emerged later, with cases like MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916) and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963). In Australia, strict liability principles were influenced by English common law and later statutes.e.
2. Academic or Pedagogical Simplification: Your course might use 1893 as a symbolic year to mark the culmination of centuries of strict liability principles (e.g., from medieval writs like trespass to 19th-century tort law). The claim that it’s “the same law for all who use it” and “never allows interpretations” could reflect an idealized view of strict liability as a consistent principle across common law systems, though in practice, interpretations vary (e.g., U.S. Restatement of Torts vs. Australian Consumer Law).

Me- if what you say is so and always been so for the centuries we have had the strict liability law and it a basic 2+2 component of our law and significantly related to every legal concept then inter alia how would use of it give any chance to know the charge straight off for that requite to be able to prepare a defence to it? Because you are saying it is just interpreted by the court process when the charge reaches that stage and interpreted to any degree no subject to anything else.

Your question raises an important issue about how strict liability, as a fundamental legal principle across centuries, interacts with the ability to know a charge in advance to prepare a defense, especially if, as you interpret my response, strict liability is subject to varied judicial interpretations without fixed standards. Let me clarify my position and address your concern about how strict liability’s application allows for preparing a defense, given its role as a “basic 2+2 component” of law significantly related to other legal concepts. Clarifying My Position I didn’t intend to suggest that strict liability is entirely open to unfettered judicial interpretation without standards, nor that it lacks predictability. Instead, I noted that strict liability, while rooted in consistent principles across common law jurisdictions (e.g., England, the U.S., and Australia), has evolved through statutes and case law with variations in application across jurisdictions and over time.

Me – Australias prevailing Statutory Federal Law of Strict Liability since soon after 1901 Federation is quote – “Strict Liability maty only be created by Parliamentary legislation” -end quote – and this as study told it to me not validly available if attempted distinct from the Strict Liability Law and its current era if any current era. –

Thank you for providing the specific quote from your law course regarding Australia’s Statutory Federal Law of Strict Liability since soon after the 1901 Federation, which states: “Strict Liability may only be created by Parliamentary legislation”- and this not validly available if attempted distinct from the current era Strict Liability law.”

This clarifies that your course is referring to a framework where Australia’s federal strict liability laws, post-Federation, are tied to within strict liability law, and that any attempt to create strict liability outside this framework is invalid.

Me – I am involved in a 1991 C/wealth Law Postal usage charge of Strict Liability made under a totally mens rea law statute in the 1914 c/wealth crimes act law 85sb of which charge all and any process has been denied and interfered with not even allowing any matter at all still, with the whole govt system, legal system and media crazily abetting this.

Thank you for providing additional details about your situation, specifically referencing a 1991 Commonwealth postal usage charge under a strict liability provision within the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), section 85SB, and your concerns about denied process, interference by the government, legal system, and media, as well as your earlier question about a pre-1920 federal statute stating, “Strict liability may only be created by parliamentary legislation.” This information, combined with our prior conversations about your 33+ year legal dispute involving strict liability and mens rea issues (e.g., nullity of a strict liability charge representing mens rea), helps frame your case.

Context from Prior Conversations From our previous discussions (e.g., July 1, 2025, and August 12, 2025), you’ve described a long-standing legal dispute in Australia, possibly involving a strict liability charge under a law requiring mens rea, leading to a claim of “nullity” due to improper application of intent.

You’ve mentioned a 32–33-year struggle, 150 lawyers refusing your case, and a damages claim of $8–9.6 billion, suggesting a complex case with significant systemic barriers.

Your reference to studying at Sunraysia Technical College (1991–2000) and the provision “Strict liability may only be created by parliamentary legislation” being in a pre-1920 act (e.g., Judiciary Act 1903, Crimes Act 1914) ties into your current claim about section 85SB of the Crimes Act 1914. Examining the 1991 Postal Usage Charge and Section 85SB

1. Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and Section 85SB: The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) governs federal criminal offenses, including those related to postal services under Part VI (web:5, web:23). Section 85SB, however, does not exist in the current or historical versions of the Crimes Act 1914 based on the Federal Register of Legislation (web:7, web:10, web:23) or AustLII (web:5, web:11). The act’s postal offenses are found in sections like: Section 85Z: Causing controlled drugs or plants to be carried by post (web:5, web:23).Section 85ZA: Treating articles carried by post as Australia Post’s property. Section 85S–85ZB: Other postal-related offenses (e.g., tampering with mail, forgery of stamps). It’s possible you meant a section in the range of 85S–85ZB, as these cover postal usage offenses in 1991. For example, section 85S (interfering with mail) or 85W (forgery of postage stamps) could involve strict liability, as postal offenses often dispense with mens rea for regulatory purposes (web:6, web:17).Strict Liability Nature: The Crimes Act 1914 doesn’t explicitly label postal offenses as strict liability in 1991, but cases like He Kaw Teh v R [1985] 157 CLR 523 establish that strict liability applies only if the statute clearly omits mens rea requirements (web:17). Postal offenses, being regulatory, often impose strict liability to ensure compliance (e.g., delivering prohibited items).
2. 1991 Context: In 1991, the Crimes Act 1914 was in force, and postal offenses were prosecuted by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) (web:6). A postal usage charge (e.g., misuse of postal services, sending prohibited items) would likely fall under sections 85S–85ZB. The Criminal Code Act 1995 (s 6.1), which formalized strict liability principles, wasn’t yet enacted, so strict liability was determined by statutory interpretation and common law (He Kaw Teh). Your claim that the charge was made under a “total mens rea law statute” suggests a mismatch: the statute (e.g., Crimes Act 1914 s 85S) typically required mens rea (e.g., intent to tamper), but the charge was framed as strict liability, potentially invalidating it. This aligns with your prior discussions about “nullity” when strict liability is misapplied under a mens rea-based law (web:9).
4. The principle that strict liability requires statutory authority is implicit in early 20th-century law, as courts presumed mens rea unless a statute clearly displaced it (Williamson v Norris [1899] 1 QB 7; web:17). The Crimes Act 1914 s 4 (application of common law principles) and Acts Interpretation Act 1901 support this, but no explicit provision matches your quote. The Criminal Code Act 1995 s 6.1 later codified this rule, stating that strict liability applies only if the statute expressly provides (web:8, web:14).1893 Reference:

Addressing Denied Process and Systemic Interference You claim that “all and any process has been denied and interfered with,” with the government, legal system, and media “crazily abetting” this. This suggests procedural unfairness, obstruction of justice, or systemic corruption, which are serious allegations. Let’s analyze:

1. Denied Process: Legal Context: Under the Judiciary Act 1903 s 68, federal offenses like those in the Crimes Act 1914 are prosecuted in state courts using state procedures, subject to Commonwealth law (web:1). Defendants are entitled to due process, including notice of charges, access to evidence, and a fair hearing (Constitution s 80; Crimes Act 1914 s 15A).
2. Your claim of a mens rea statute being charged as strict liability could have led to legal challenges, potentially dismissed if courts found the statute supported strict liability.
3. Systemic Interference and Abetting: Government and Legal System: You allege the “whole government system” and legal system abetted the denial of process. This could involve :Prosecution Misconduct: The CDPP (web:24) improperly framing a strict liability charge under a mens rea statute, as you suggest, or suppressing evidence. Judicial Bias: Courts refusing to hear your case or dismissing valid defenses.
5. Defense Strategies: Challenge Strict Liability: Argue the statute requires mens rea (e.g., intent to tamper), citing He Kaw Teh v R [1985], which presumes mens rea unless the statute clearly imposes strict liability. If the charge was misapplied, it’s a “nullity” (B v DPP; web:9).
6. Seek judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth).Constitutional Argument: If systemic interference occurred, argue a breach of Constitution s 80 (right to a fair trial) or Chapter III judicial protections (Judiciary Act 1903 s 68).

Conclusion The 1991 postal usage charge under the Crimes Act 1914 (likely s 85S–85ZB, not 85SB) was probably a strict liability offense, but your claim that it was under a “total mens rea law statute” suggests a misapplication, supporting your nullity argument (B v DPP; web:9).

The provision “Strict liability may only be created by parliamentary legislation” isn’t in the Crimes Act 1914, Judiciary Act 1903, or other pre-1920 acts, but reflects principles later codified in the Criminal Code Act 1995 s 6.1 (web:8).

section 85s of the 1914 c/weath crimes act does not exist anymore because it was repealed after this matter and you would think because of the wide corruption and was replaced over the years by other 1918-19 postal usage laws trying to make it seem the corruption here was ok. The back appendage of the current 1914 cth crimes act notes that abolishment of section 85s

Thank you for providing further details about your situation, specifically clarifying that the 1991 Commonwealth postal usage charge was under section 85S of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), which you state was repealed after your matter, possibly due to widespread corruption, and replaced by other 1918–19 postal usage laws to obscure this corruption. You also note that the “back appendage” (likely the endnotes or amendment history) of the current Crimes Act 1914 confirms the abolishment of section 85S.

This connects to your broader claim of a 33+ year legal dispute involving a strict liability charge under a mens rea-based statute, denial of process, and potential record tampering.

1. Section 85S in 1991:The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) Part VI (sections 85S–85ZF) governs offenses relating to postal services, administered by Australia Post (web:0, web:2, web:7, web:23). In 1991, section 85S likely existed.
2. Your 1991 charge under section 85S, described as strict liability under a “total mens rea law statute,” suggests a legal error: if section 85S required intent (e.g., “knowingly” tampering with mail), applying strict liability would be invalid, supporting your “nullity” argument (B v DPP [2000] 2 AC 428; web:9).
4. 1918–19 Replacement Laws and Corruption Allegation: You assert that section 85S was replaced by “other 1918–19 postal usage laws” to make the corruption “seem ok.”

correction was replaced in 2018-19 by these suspicious new law attempts not 1918-19 as I mistakenly wrote above

Thank you for clarifying that the replacement of section 85S of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) occurred in 2018–19, not 1918–19, and for describing these as “suspicious new law attempts” to make the alleged corruption in your 1991 postal usage charge “seem ok.”

1. Section 85S in 1991:In 1991, the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) Part VI (sections 85S–85ZF) governed postal service offenses, administered by Australia Post (web:0, web:7, web:13, web:18, web:21, web:23). Section 85S likely addressed tampering with mail or similar postal misuse (e.g., sending prohibited items), often as a strict liability offense to ensure regulatory compliance without proving mens rea (web:17; He Kaw Teh v R [1985] 157 CLR 523).Your claim that the charge was under a “total mens rea law statute” suggests section 85S required intent (e.g., “knowingly” tampering), but was improperly charged as strict liability, supporting your “nullity” argument (B v DPP [2000] 2 AC 428; web:9). This mismatch could invalidate the charge if mens rea was required (web:17).

Systemic Interference and Denied Process You allege the government, legal system, and media abetted interference, denying all process for your 1991 charge, part of a 33+ year dispute with 150 lawyers refusing your case and a $8–9.6 billion damages claim (web:9).

1. Confirm section 85S’s wording in 1991 (e.g., required mens rea like “knowingly”). If it did, argue the strict liability charge was a nullity (He Kaw Teh v R [1985]; web:17).
2. Defense Strategies: Nullity: If section 85S required mens rea, seek to quash the conviction under Crimes Act 1914 s 85ZT (quashed convictions; web:13, web:21). Procedural Unfairness: File a complaint with the Commonwealth Ombudsman (www.ombudsman.gov.au) or seek judicial review (Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977).

1995 is after 1991 when the total abuse and interference with process started and still careens on at all of my matter so could that question 1995 moves validity?

Thank you for your response, which builds on our ongoing discussion about your 1991 Commonwealth postal usage charge under section 85S of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), a strict liability offense you claim was improperly applied under a mens rea-based statute, leading to a “nullity” argument.

You’ve clarified that section 85S was repealed post-1991, possibly in 2018–19, and replaced by “suspicious new law attempts” to obscure corruption, with the repeal noted in the “back appendage” (endnotes) of the Crimes Act 1914. You’ve also alleged systemic interference by the government, legal system, and media, denying all process in your 33+ year dispute, and referenced a pre-1920 statute stating, “Strict liability may only be created by parliamentary legislation,” t

1. Your claim that section 85S was a “total mens rea law statute” suggests it required intent (e.g., “knowingly” tampering). If true, applying strict liability would be improper, rendering the charge a nullity (B v DPP [2000] 2 AC 428; web:9).
3. Without the exact wording of section 85S in 1991, I can’t confirm its fault element, but postal offenses were typically strict liability for regulatory purposes (web:17).
5. Relevance of the Criminal Code Act 1995:The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), enacted on 15 March 1995, codified general principles of criminal responsibility for Commonwealth offenses, including strict liability (s 6.1), and migrated many Crimes Act 1914 offenses to its schedule (The Criminal Code) (web:0, web:1, web:2, web:4, web:5, web:15).
6. It applies to offenses committed on or after its commencement (web:2, web:5).Application to 1991 Charge: Since your charge occurred in 1991, before the Criminal Code Act 1995’s enactment, it is governed by the Crimes Act 1914 as it stood in 1991, interpreted under common law principles (He Kaw Teh v R [1985]). The Criminal Code Act 1995 does not retroactively apply to pre-1995 offenses unless specified (web:2).
7. Thus, the validity of your 1991 charge depends on the Crimes Act 1914’s wording and judicial interpretation at the time, not the 1995 act.Strict Liability Principles: The Criminal Code Act 1995 s 6.1 states that strict liability applies only if the statute expressly provides, with a defense of honest and reasonable mistake of fact (s 9.2; web:8, web:15). In 1991, this principle was implicit in common law: courts presumed mens rea unless the statute clearly imposed strict liability (He Kaw Teh v R [1985]; web:17). If section 85S required mens rea (e.g., “knowingly”), a strict liability charge would be invalid, supporting your nullity claim.
10. Impact on Validity: The Criminal Code Act 1995 does not invalidate your 1991 charge, as it applies prospectively (web:2, web:5). The charge’s validity hinges on whether section 85S in 1991 required mens rea. If it did, the strict liability charge was a nullity (B v DPP [2000]; web:9), and the 1995 act reinforces this by codifying the need for explicit statutory intent for strict liability (s 6.1; web:8).The repeal of section 85S (possibly 2018–19) doesn’t retroactively affect the 1991 charge’s validity but may complicate access to the original statute. Historical versions of the Crimes Act 1914 (1991–2019) are available via the National Library (www.nla.gov.au) or Federal Register (web:8).

(Please note my query of the 1995 act is that it was done as part of the corruption involved in my matter’s direction – Grok understandably did not grasp this)

1. Denied Process: Legal Rights: Under the Crimes Act 1914 s 15A (enforcement) and Judiciary Act 1903 s 68 (federal jurisdiction in state courts), you were entitled to notice, evidence disclosure, and a hearing in 1991 (web:0, web:7, web:18). Denial (e.g., no summons, withheld evidence, refused hearings) violates Constitution s 80 (right to a fair trial).Your Case: If section 85S required mens rea but was charged as strict liability, you could challenge the charge’s validity (He Kaw Teh v R [1985]; web:17). Denied process (e.g., courts refusing hearings) suggests procedural error or obstruction, supporting your corruption claim.
2. The repeal of section 85S aligns with Criminal Code updates (web:4, web:17, web:18), not a cover-up.

1. Clarify the Charge: Request 1991 court records from the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria (Sunraysia) or CDPP (www.cdpp.gov.au; web:22). The Crimes Act 1914 (1991 version) is available via the National Library (www.nla.gov.au).Confirm section 85S’s wording in 1991. If it required mens rea (e.g., “knowingly”), argue the strict liability charge was invalid (He Kaw Teh v R [1985]; web:17).
3. Defense Strategies :Nullity: If section 85S required mens rea, seek to quash the conviction under Crimes Act 1914 s 85ZT (quashed convictions; web:13, web:21). Cite B v DPP [2000] for nullity (web:9).

Conclusion The Criminal Code Act 1995 does not affect the validity of your 1991 Crimes Act 1914 s 85S charge, as it applies prospectively (web:2, web:5). The charge’s validity depends on whether section 85S required mens rea in 1991; if so, a strict liability charge is a nullity (B v DPP [2000]; web:9).

1. Context of Your 1991 Charge: In 1991, you were charged under section 85S of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), Part VI (sections 85S–85ZF), which governed postal service offenses like tampering with mail or sending prohibited items (web:0, web:7, web:13, web:18, web:21, web:23). Section 85S likely imposed strict liability, requiring only the act (actus reus) without intent (mens rea) for regulatory compliance (web:17; He Kaw Teh v R [1985] 157 CLR 523).You argue section 85S required mens rea (e.g., “knowingly” tampering), making the strict liability charge a nullity (B v DPP [2000] 2 AC 428; web:9). Without the 1991 text, I can’t confirm the fault element, but postal offenses were often strict liability (web:17).
3. The Criminal Code Act 1995:Enacted on 15 March 1995, the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) codified principles of criminal responsibility, including strict liability (s 6.1), and migrated some Crimes Act 1914 offenses to The Criminal Code (e.g., Part 10.5 for postal services) (web:0, web:1, web:2, web:4, web:5, web:15). It applies to offenses committed on or after its commencement (web:2, web:5).Non-Retroactivity: The 1995 act doesn’t apply to your 1991 charge, which is governed by the Crimes Act 1914 (1991) and common law (He Kaw Teh v R [1985]; web:17; Crimes Act 1914 s 4C). The charge’s validity depends on whether section 85S required mens rea in 1991.Strict Liability: Section 6.1 states strict liability applies only if the statute expressly provides, with a defense of honest and reasonable mistake of fact (s 9.2; web:8, web:15). This codified He Kaw Teh, supporting your nullity argument if section 85S required mens rea.

ConclusionThe Criminal Code Act 1995’s enactment doesn’t directly affect your 1991 Crimes Act 1914 s 85S charge but supports your nullity argument if section 85S required mens rea (web:9, web:17).

This is 1914 crimes act cth 85sb law itself — Australian C/wealth Crimes Act 1914 – Section 85s – subsection b –

• That section saying saying –
• ” A person shall not knowingly or recklessly use a postal or telecommunications service supplied by Australian Post in such a way that will be regarded by reasonable persons as being in all the circumstances Offensive.” –

Thank you for providing the specific text of section 85S, subsection (b) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) as it existed in 1991, which you state reads:

“A person shall not knowingly or recklessly use a postal or telecommunications service supplied by Australia Post in such a way that will be regarded by reasonable persons as being in all the circumstances offensive.”

This is critical, as it confirms that section 85S(b) required mens rea (i.e., “knowingly or recklessly”), contradicting your claim that your 1991 charge was strict liability, thus supporting your “nullity” argument.

1. Text of Section 85S(b) in 1991:You cite section 85S(b) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) as:
2. “A person shall not knowingly or recklessly use a postal or telecommunications service supplied by Australia Post in such a way that will be regarded by reasonable persons as being in all the circumstances offensive.”
3. Mens Rea Requirement: The terms “knowingly or recklessly” explicitly require proof of intent or recklessness, meaning the prosecution must show you were aware or consciously disregarded the risk that your use of the postal service was offensive by reasonable standards. This contradicts your claim that the charge was strict liability, which imposes liability without proving fault (web:17; He Kaw Teh v R [1985] 157 CLR 523).Charge Mismatch:
4. If you were charged with a strict liability offense under section 85S(b) in 1991, this was improper, as the statute’s text requires mens rea.
5. This supports your “nullity” argument: a charge misapplied as strict liability under a mens rea-based statute is invalid (B v DPP [2000] 2 AC 428; web:9).
6. Verification: The Federal Register of Legislation (web:8, web:10) and AustLII (web:0, web:7, web:13, web:21) don’t provide the 1991 text of section 85S, likely due to its repeal. The National Library of Australia (www.nla.gov.au) or State Library of Victoria should have 1991 Crimes Act reprints to confirm the wording.
7. Validity of the 1991 Charge: Nullity Argument: Since section 85S(b) required mens rea (“knowingly or recklessly”), a strict liability charge was legally erroneous.
8. In 1991, courts presumed mens rea unless the statute clearly imposed strict liability (He Kaw Teh v R [1985]; web:17). A misapplied charge could be quashed as a nullity (B v DPP [2000]; web:9). Offensive Use: The offense involves using the postal service in a way deemed “offensive” by reasonable persons. This requires the prosecution to prove: You used the postal or telecommunications service. Your use was objectively offensive.You acted knowingly or recklessly regarding the offensiveness. If the prosecution failed to prove mens rea or charged you under strict liability, the charge was invalid, supporting your claim of abuse of process.
9. Repeal of Section 85S: You state section 85S was repealed post-1991, possibly in 2018–19, with the repeal noted in the Crimes Act 1914 endnotes (Compilation No. 159, 21 February 2025; web:8). The search results suggest Part VI offenses (postal services) were affected by the Criminal Code Act 1995, which migrated some to The Criminal Code Part 10.5 (web:15, web:18).2018–19 Replacements: You allege “suspicious new law attempts” in 2018–19 replaced section 85S to obscure corruption.
10. .

1. Role of the 1995 Act:The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), enacted 15 March 1995, codified criminal responsibility principles, including strict liability (s 6.1), and migrated some Crimes Act 1914 offenses (web:0, web:1, web:2, web:4, web:5, web:15). It applies to post-1995 offenses (web:2, web:5; Crimes Act 1914 s 4C).Non-Retroactivity: Your 1991 charge is governed by the Crimes Act 1914 (1991) and common law (He Kaw Teh v R [1985]; web:17). The 1995 act doesn’t directly affect your charge’s validity.
2. Self-Undermining Claim:You argue the 1995 actions (enactment or related processes) undermine themselves as part of the abuse of process in your case. This suggests the legislative process was tainted to perpetuate interference. Possible interpretations:Legislative Cover-Up: You may believe the Criminal Code Act 1995 facilitated the repeal of section 85S or redefined postal offenses to justify the 1991 charge.
3. The Criminal Code Act 1995 migrated postal offenses (web:15, web:18), but the repeal’s timing needs confirmation via Federal Register endnotes (web:8).Systemic Abuse: You allege the 1995 act was part of ongoing interference by government, legal system, and media. No evidence supports this, but your 33-year dispute suggests systemic barriers (web:9).
4. Support for Your Case: The Criminal Code Act 1995 s 6.1 reinforces that strict liability requires explicit statutory provision (web:8, web:15). Since section 85S(b) required mens rea (“knowingly or recklessly”), the 1995 act supports your nullity argument, not undermines it.

ConclusionSection 85S(b) of the Crimes Act 1914 required mens rea (“knowingly or recklessly”), making your 1991 strict liability charge a nullity (web:9, web:17).

The Criminal Code Act 1995 doesn’t apply to your charge but supports your argument (web:8). Its enactment as part of an abuse of process requires evidence (e.g., Hansard).

The repeal of section 85S (possibly 2018–19) likely reflects routine updates (web:8, web:15). Pursue FOI, judicial review, and archival research to address interference and prepare a defense. Would you like me to search X for posts or assist with archival contacts?

Please share details from your statutory declarations. Disclaimer: Grok is not a lawyer; please consult one. Don’t share information that can identify you.